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Abstract
We study what induces delinquent taxpayers to pay their taxes due. We use high quality admin-
istrative data from the Swedish Tax Agency. We find a strong effect of the standard enforcement
regime: a threat of having the debt handed over to the Enforcement Agency increases payments
by roughly 10 percentage points. When including actual enforcement, payment increases by
around 20 percentage points compared to those who do not risk enforcement. In a field ex-
periment, we compare these effects of standard enforcement to those of much milder nudges,
consisting of letters reminding tax delinquents to pay their taxes due. We find that a “pure
nudge”, i.e., the inclusion of an extra piece of paper with no valuable information, has an effect
of 7-8 percentage points for those who do not risk enforcement upon non-payment. However, the
same nudge has no detectable effect for the group at risk of enforcement. Social-norm messages
in turn increase payments both for those who risk enforcement and for those who do not, but to
a much smaller degree. We also find that a pure nudge works much better for those who receive
a physical letter than for those who receive information electronically, while the reaction to the
social-norm nudge is significant for those who get the electronic information.
Keywords: tax compliance, RCT, nudge, quasi-experiment, regression discontinuity
JEL Codes: C21, D03, D91, H24, H26
∗We would like to thank seminar participants at the TARC 5th Annual Workshop in Exeter and Dep of Econ
at Uppsala University for their valuable comments and suggestions. Financial support from the Swedish Research
Council, project no. 2016-01485-3 and Riksbankens Jubileumsfond, project no. P19-0448:1 are gratefully acknowl-
edged. Henrik Andersson is further grateful for financing from Handelsbankens forskningsstiftelser. This study is
registered in the AEA RCT Registry: AEARCTR-0002208.
†Department of Economics, Uppsala University, P.O. Box 513, SE-751 20 Uppsala, Sweden and Institute for
Housing and Urban Research (IBF) (email: henrik.andersson@nek.uu.se)
‡Department of Economics, Uppsala University, P.O. Box 513, SE-751 20 Uppsala, Sweden and Uppsala Center
for Fiscal Studies (UCFS) (email: per.engstrom@nek.uu.se)
§Department of Economics, University of Gothenburg, P.O. Box 640, SE-405 30 Gothenburg, Sweden, and UCFS
(email: katarina.nordblom@economics.gu.se)
¶The Swedish Tax Agency, SE-171 94 Solna, Sweden (email: susanna.wanander@skatteverket.se)
1 Introduction
An important question to many governments and tax agencies is how tax compliance could be
improved. Although most people are unable to under-report income in many Western countries
with extensive third-party reporting, delinquent taxes are a problem to many tax authorities. In
order to promote overall tax compliance, a relevant question is how delinquent taxpayers can be
induced to actually pay their taxes due. The answer depends on what motivates and restricts them.
In this paper we try to find that out for Swedish tax delinquents both by making use of a legal
discontinuity in the treatment of delinquencies and by conducting a field experiment in the same
vein as, e.g., Hallsworth et al. (2017) and Imbert et al. (2020).
We analyze the effects from both the standard enforcement and milder nudges. An important
value added of our study is that we are able to quantify the relative importance of the two in the
same context. Moreover, we compare the effects of a pure nudge, i.e., something which catches
the taxpayers attention without really being relevant for the task (Löfgren and Nordblom, 2020)
with a nudge alluding to social norms. We also study the effect of information on enforcement
consequences (in the spirit of e.g., Cranor et al., 2020).
More specifically, in a first step, we isolate the effect of the standard enforcement regime. The
identification relies on a discontinuity in the treatment of taxpayers. Tax debts below SEK 2,000
(approx. EUR 200) are due to interest, but there is no real enforcement. Debts exceeding SEK
2,000 are instead handed over, from the Swedish Tax Agency (hereinafter STA) to the Enforcement
Agency (hereinafter EA). Before the debt is handed over to the EA the taxpayer is warned that it
will upon non-payment. This makes it possible to study both the short-run effect of the "threat" of
EA and the longer-run effect including actual enforcement, separately. The threat of having debt
transferred to the EA is real (all non-payers are transferred to the EA) and the consequences are
severe: a SEK 600 fee has to be paid and if the debt is not paid immediately the taxpayer may get
a distraint order and be subject to payment default. Such default makes it very hard to rent an
apartment, get a loan or a credit card.
Thanks to the STA’s pervading adherence to the SEK 2,000 rule, we are able to identify the
effect of the ordinary enforcement regime using a standard RD design (see e.g., Lee and Lemieux,
2010). In this analysis we use a sample of about 100,000 Swedes who had not paid their taxes in due
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time in the years 2016 and 2017. All of those got a letter from the STA in December. Those below
the threshold got just a reminder, while those above also got noticed that upon not paying, the debt
would be transferred to the EA.1 Just below the threshold, around 58 percent paid their debt during
December, while 66 percent just above it did.2 Those with a debt above the threshold who failed
to pay by the end of December got their debt transferred to the EA in January. To include actual
enforcement, we compare the likelihood of paying during the period December through February.
Then, 66 percent below the threshold had paid, while 83 percent above it had paid. Hence, our RD
design renders strong effects on tax payments, both from the threat of enforcement and from actual
enforcement.
Having demonstrated the effect of standard enforcement, in a second step, we conducted a
randomized field experiment (following, e.g., Hallsworth et al., 2017) among those who were late
with their tax payments in 2018, to investigate if a similar effect could be reached by milder nudges.
Transferring tax debts to the EA is costly, both from an overall fiscal point of view and from the
perspective of the individual taxpayer. Much would be gained if the STA could make delinquents
pay without actual enforcement. We conducted an RCT among the 57,000 tax delinquents who had
between SEK 1,000 and SEK 3,000 in taxes due in December 2018. We randomized two different
messages for those with a debt below SEK 2,000: one pure nudge letter (letter 1) and one letter
alluding to social norms (letter 2). The pure-nudge letter was simply an extra sheet stating that
it is time to pay your taxes due. The letter alluding to social norms (letter 2) followed the most
effective formulation from Hallsworth et al. (2017): “More than nine out of ten people pay their tax
on time. You belong to the minority who have not paid us yet”.3
For those whose taxes due exceeded SEK 2,000, there was an actual threat of enforcement irre-
spective of any behavioral intervention. Some taxpayers may not understand the full consequences
of this and may therefore comply to a lesser extent than had they understood. For those with a
debt exceeding SEK 2,000, we therefore added an explaining treatment, where the consequences
of having the debt transferred to the EA are explained in short (letter 3). We also add a joint
treatment with both the minority norm and the explanation (letter 4), making delinquents receive
one out of four different messages.
1See Appendix E for the exact design and formulations.
2“Just below” and “just above” in this specific example means SEK 400 below and above the threshold.
3See Section 3.2 for the exact formulations of all letters.
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The STA did not allow any random group of taxpayers to be untreated (i.e. to receive only
the ordinary payment reminder) which means that everyone in the debt range SEK 1,000 to SEK
3,000 received either letter 1, 2, 3 or 4. We therefore measure the effect of the pure nudge (letter
1) as opposed to the standard regime using an RD at the SEK 1,000 and SEK 3,000 thresholds,
respectively.
Similar to, e.g., Del Carpio (2014), Hallsworth et al. (2017), and Alm et al. (2019), we find a
strong effect of a pure nudge (letter 1) for those with debt below SEK 2,000, i.e., those who do not
risk actual enforcement upon not paying. For those with a tax debt below SEK 2,000, the inclusion
of an extra sheet, simply stating that the taxes are due, has an effect on tax payments of the same
magnitude as the threat of having the debt transferred to EA. The effect of this pure nudge is
around 7–8 percentage points on both short and longer-run payment. The pure nudge effect is
thus instant and does not grow over time. This is consistent with Antinyan and Asatryan (2020),
who in their meta-study including 41 studies, find that nudges aimed at increasing tax compliance
mainly have short-run effects. Also, the theoretical results by Löfgren and Nordblom (2020) suggest
that instant choices are more easily nudged than choices where individuals carefully think through
the alternatives. They also claim that nudges are more effective for choices that are considered
unimportant. As the consequences of not paying are more severe for those whose debt exceeds SEK
2,000, the payment decision should be more important for those with larger debt. In line with that
reasoning, we find no clearly significant effect from the neutral letter on tax payments for those
whose taxes due exceed SEK 2,000.
We get a significant, albeit small effect from the minority norm (letter 2), compared to letter 1,
irrespective of the size of the debt: The likelihood of paying in December is 2.5-3 percentage points
higher for those who receive letter 2 than for those receiving letter 1. Those with a debt below SEK
2,000 who receive the minority-norm letter are around 9-10 percentage points more likely to pay
than had they not been nudged at all. Giving a short information about the consequences of having
debt transferred to EA (letter 3) has about the same short-run effect as letter 2 on those whose debt
exceeds SEK 2,000. However, the combined message had an effect of almost 5 percentage points
compared to letter 1. This means that the social-norm and information nudges actually complement
each-other, while the pure nudge has no statistical effect once there is a threat of enforcement. The
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longer-run effects are much lower for those with large debts, which is expected since those who do
not pay in December are handed over to EA for actual enforcement in January whether they were
nudged or not.
Salience is one reason that nudges affect behavior; e.g., adding an extra piece of paper in a letter,
which makes it look different, may catch the reader’s eye and thereby affect behavior. As many
public authorities around the world now want to communicate electronically with citizens rather
than on paper, one may suspect that the potential for nudges would diminish. Including an extra
piece of paper or a hand-written note are nudges that might primarily work with physical letters.
In our experiment, we have a unique opportunity to study the effect of nudges both in physical and
in electronic letters. We find that the pure nudge, i.e., just adding an extra page has a much larger
effect for those who get a physical letter than for those who get an electronic one. However, the
difference in responses to the letters is smaller when it comes to the social-norm nudge (letter 2).
Adding more content to the letter thus seem to reduce the difference in response between physical
and electronic letters. These results should, however, be taken as descriptive and not necessarily
causal – since the experiment did not randomize who received electronic versus paper letters, the
usual caveat regarding selection on unobservables applies.
Our study first and foremost adds to the large literature on tax compliance. In particular, this
literature has dealt with the relative importance of extrinsic and intrinsic motivation. While much
work since Allingham and Sandmo (1972) have pointed to the impact of enforcement, intrinsic
motivation has been put forward as also being of importance for compliance (see, e.g., Luttmer and
Singhal, 2014). In particular, social norms have been suggested to guide compliance behavior. E.g.,
Myles and Naylor (1996), Fortin et al. (2007), and Besley et al. (2019) argue that people are more
likely to comply with taxes when they are surrounded by a vast majority of compliant taxpayers.
Hallsworth et al. (2017) found, when running an RCT on 200,000 British tax delinquents, that
letters alluding to social norms were indeed effective in increasing compliance. Several studies have
since then adopted a similar approach, and often tax authorities have collaborated with researchers
in order to make use of such social-norm nudges to influence people’s behavior.4 The results are
mixed and one cannot neglect the contextual factor. Hallsworth et al. (2017), Bott et al. (2019)
4E.g., Bott et al. (2019) in Norway, Kettle et al. (2016) in Guatemala, Hernandez et al. (2017) in Poland, Cranor
et al. (2020), John and Blume (2018) in the UK, Imbert et al. (2020) in Belgium.
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and Del Carpio (2014) are examples where nudges of moral suasion significantly have increased tax
compliance, while Cranor et al. (2020) and Imbert et al. (2020) find no such effects. Instead Cranor
et al. (2020) find that making details of the penalty salient increases compliance, a strategy which
increased compliance also in the studies by Hallsworth et al. (2017) and Bott et al. (2019). In a
large-scale experiment including several stages of tax payment in Belgium, Imbert et al. (2020) find
that deterrence treatments are often effective and that simplification always has a positive effect on
compliance.
While our paper provides many results, a key take-away is that a mild nudge gives almost the
same short-run effect on Swedish tax delinquents as a threat of being handed over to the EA. Since
the EA treatment is costly to both the individuals and the government, this result is of high policy
relevance. However, the results from one country and in one context cannot be directly applied to
other contexts without further scrutiny. Countries differ in terms of general tax morale, institutions
and tax administration, which may be crucial to the effects from a certain intervention. It is
therefore interesting to note that the threat of being transferred to the EA is indeed something that
Swedes do not take lightly. In 2017, a survey was conducted among 1,000 representative Swedes5
and almost 4 out of 5 answered that they would consider it very severe to have a debt transferred
to the EA. Furthermore, the threat of being transferred is real. Our analysis shows that more
than 99 percent of the debts were indeed handed over to the EA conditional on no payment, and
the STA consistently ranks in the absolute top in terms of public institutions that Swedes trust 6.
Given these Swedish idiosyncrasies, the high relative effect of a simple pure nudge compared to the
standard enforcement is even more striking, and more likely to carry over to other contexts with
weaker possibilities of traditional enforcement.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 gives an institutional background to the
Swedish setting as well as presenting hypotheses based on previous theoretical and empirical litera-
ture. The research design is explained in Section 3 and we present the results in Section 4. Section
5 concludes the paper.
5See Nordblom (2017) for details about the survey.
6See Swedish trust indicator 2020
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2 Theoretical and institutional background
2.1 Tax payment and tax enforcement in Sweden
In this section we describe the Swedish taxation model, the Swedish Tax Agency (STA), the En-
forcement Agency (EA), and some key facts about tax payment in Sweden.
In Sweden, employers withdraw preliminary taxes before the employees receive their net salary
during the income year. Also, banks and financial institutions withhold taxes at source on capital
income. In April, the following year, taxpayers file their tax returns and are able to add extra
income or claim deductions. Most taxpayers make no changes to their tax returns and for a majority,
preliminary tax withdrawals just slightly exceed final taxes, so that they can expect a small tax
refund (Engström et al., 2015). However, roughly one in five of taxpayers have paid too little. In
August, final tax assessments are sent to the taxpayers and those with taxes due are requested to
pay their debt to the STA by mid November. Those who neglect to pay get a reminder in early
December. However, the formulation of the reminder depends on the size of the tax debt as the
treatment of debt if not paying differs. An illustration of a time line of the Swedish tax process is
seen in Figure 1.
Figure 1: The tax year (tax filing year 2018)











letter sent With EA:
if payment
still due
If the debt falls below SEK 2,000 (approx. EUR 200), Swedish law postulates that a sizable
interest (16.25 percent on a yearly basis) is added to the debt, but there is no actual enforcement
to induce the payment to the STA. However, debts exceeding SEK 2,000 are handed over to the
EA in January, which makes a big difference. Although debts handed over to EA are subject to
lower interest (1.25 percent on a yearly basis), there is an extra fee of SEK 600 associated with
the debt, so the extra cost from not paying at once is higher above the threshold than below it.
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Moreover, if the debt is not paid immediately the EA could set a distraint and the taxpayer may
be subject to payment default. A payment default makes it very hard to rent an apartment, get
a loan or a credit card since Swedish law allows anyone to request a transcript from the payment
default records that are public information. To request such transcript is standard practice before
entering substantial economic agreements. Apart from the instrumental costs there is likely also a
subjective social stigma of a payment default or a distraint.
To those whose tax debts amount to SEK 2,000 or more, the standard December letter thus
informs that the debt will be handed over to the EA if it is not paid by the end of December.
Those whose December debts fall below SEK 2,000 instead receive a simple payment reminder.
See Appendix E for the design of these letters. The discontinuity produced by the SEK 2,000
threshold will be used to identify the causal effect of the standard enforcement practice through an
RD approach in Section 3.1.
2.2 Theoretical and descriptive background
We want to study the relative importance of enforcement and milder nudges in making tax delin-
quents pay their taxes due. The study population consists of tax delinquents, i.e., those who have
failed to pay their taxes due by mid November a certain year. The standard framework explaining
tax compliance from e.g., Allingham and Sandmo (1972) is thus not fully applicable. We are not
dealing with non-compliance in the sense of concealing information; the tax authority has already
decided on an amount that the individual decides to pay or not. Hence, risk aversion and the like-
lihood of being audited are no issues here. Everyone who fails to pay is either forced to pay by the
EA or has to pay a sizable interest rate, depending on the size of the tax debt. Hence, enforcement
by the EA is the main “hard” economic factor we could study that could possibly affect behavior.
In accordance with this we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 1. Those who receive a letter with the threat of enforcement are more likely to pay
than those who just receive a reminder.
An important dimension of this study is to compare the standard enforcement regime with
milder nudges. What to expect from such nudges does, however, depend on the type of nudge.
A natural starting point is what is sometimes labelled as a “pure nudge”. A pure nudge is one
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that catches the attention of the decision maker, but is unrelated to the choice itself (Löfgren and
Nordblom, 2020). Del Carpio (2014), Hallsworth et al. (2017), and Alm et al. (2019) actually find
that the mere inclusion of a message affects taxpayers’ behavior, and that it is less important what
the message expresses. Following the results from these studies, we expect taxpayers to react to a
pure nudge, e.g., to a message that does not provide any useful information at all, but only catches
their attention:
Hypothesis 2. Tax delinquents react to a pure nudge.
Moreover, in the literature on nudging (not specifically on taxpaying) it has been pointed out
that nudges are more likely to be effective for choices that are made inattentively, i.e., without
much thought. Hence, if people do not pay much attention to the letter they receive from STA, a
nudge would play a larger role than if people read carefully and really analyze what would be the
best alternative (to pay or not). People tend to pay more attention to important choices than to
unimportant ones and are therefore more likely to be nudgeable in unimportant choice situations
(Löfgren and Nordblom, 2020). Since the consequences from not paying are more severe for tax
debts exceeding SEK 2,000 than for smaller debts, we hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 3. Nudges are more effective for taxpayers whose tax debt falls below SEK 2,000 than
for taxpayers whose debt exceeds that amount.
As a contrast to pure nudges, Löfgren and Nordblom (2020) also define preference nudges. Those
allude to the utility of the choice alternatives so that one is to be perceived as better, for instance,
by triggering some intrinsic motivation. Intrinsic motivation, such as moral duties and conforming
to social norms, has been found important to tax compliance.7 Regarding social norms, Cialdini
and Trost (1998) make the distinction between descriptive norms that explain what others do, and
injunctive norms, referring to what others think one ought to do. Jacobson et al. (2011) conclude
that injunctive norms are more powerful for invoking social obligations and Bobek et al. (2007) find,
in their hypothetical setting, that descriptive norms do not explain the compliance decision, while
injunctive norms do. However, in their study of tax delinquents, Hallsworth et al. (2017) find that
a descriptive norm has stronger impact on tax paying than has an injunctive norm.
7See, e.g., Besley et al. (2019) and Wenzel (2004), Wenzel (2005) for empirical evidence and Myles and Naylor
(1996) for a classical theoretical contribution (Also Besley et al., 2019, set up a theoretical model of tax evasion where
social norms play an important role).
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It is likely that injunctive norms, i.e., what others think is the right or wrong thing to do, is
important to the decision whether or not to evade taxes for most people. However, this is not the
decision at focus in this paper. More than 95 percent of Swedish taxpayers pay their taxes in due
time. However, we are, just as, e.g., Hallsworth et al. (2017), Chirico et al. (2019), Cranor et al.
(2020), studying tax delinquents, i.e., the small minority who have failed to live up to the social
norms in the first place.
In general, people tend to conform with others’ behavior irrespective of moral concerns (see, e.g.,
Bernheim, 1994; Myles and Naylor, 1996). Hence, for the group who has shown not to conform with
injunctive norms before (e.g., that most people think one ought to pay taxes on time), we would
expect descriptive norms to be more effective. Therefore we express the social-norm treatment in
our RCT as a descriptive norm and formulate the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 4. Reminding tax delinquents that most people pay their taxes on time has a positive
effect on tax payments.
One reason that people fail to pay their taxes may be lack of knowledge. For example, some
may not understand how much interest they pay and others may fail to grasp the full implications
of enforcement. In their large-scale experiment in Belgium, Imbert et al. (2020) find that simplifi-
cation always has a positive effect on compliance and Hallsworth et al. (2017) find that providing
information about the interest amount or facilitating payment increase tax payment. Also Cranor
et al. (2020) find that making details of the penalty salient increases compliance among tax delin-
quents. If some Swedish tax delinquents are uninformed or unaware of the consequences, providing
information about the consequences of having the debt transferred to the EA could increase their
likelihood to pay. In our RCT study we therefore also add one treatment where we briefly explain
the consequences of having debt transferred to the EA.
Hypothesis 5. Informing about the consequences of enforcement increases the likelihood of payment
among those who risk enforcement.
Finally, the share of taxpayers receiving information electronically has increased over time. In
2018 (when our RCT was conducted) 39 percent of the tax delinquents received their information
from STA electronically. A nudge where an additional piece of paper is added to a standard letter
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could be more salient if the letter is physical rather than electronic. One may therefore worry that
the prevalence of electronic rather than physical letters make taxpayers less observant. Nudges
could then be less effective for those who receive electronic letters. Very little research has been
conducted on the behavior depending on the way one receives the information, but we hypothesize
the following:
Hypothesis 6. Those who receive an electronic letter react less to nudges than those who receive a
physical letter.
3 Research Design
When testing our hypotheses, we study the behavior of delinquent Swedish taxpayers who receive
a reminder to pay their taxes in early December. The three outcome variables we are interested
in are 1) whether the taxpayer makes a payment in December, 2) whether they make a payment
during the period December–February, and 3) whether the debt is handed over to the EA or not
(for those with taxes due of at least SEK 2,000).
We use different identification strategies in different parts of the study. We will therefore describe
in detail, and in chronological order, how the analysis will proceed. Figure 2 provides an overview
of the whole study.
Some notes are warranted on the pre-analysis plan. The pre-plan only applies to the experiment
part of the study. When planning the experiment we had already started to analyze preliminary
data from 2016 in regards to the natural experiment part of the study. According to the pre-plan,
the experiment should have launched during the end of 2017. However, the experiment was delayed
for one year due to technical problems. Furthermore, the preliminary data from 2016 turned out to
be incomplete which makes the estimated sample sizes in the pre-plan quite far off the mark. The
sample sizes turned out to be quite much larger than expected. Finally, the pre-plan is of limited
value since part of the analysis we do is a rather complex mix of a natural experiment combined
with an RCT, unforeseen at the time when the plan was written. With these caveats disclosed, the
pre-plan at least shows that we stay true to the pre-registered treatments and the main outcome
variable (we had, however, also planned to analyze an additional long-run outcome that we do not
have access to).
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4. 2 and 3
SEK 100-999 SEK 1,000-1,999 SEK 2,000-2,999 SEK 3,000-3,999
3.1 RD analysis of the threat of enforcement and of actual enforcement
We start by testing Hypothesis 1, i.e., we analyze the effects of the standard enforcement strategy.
This analysis will be based on observational STA-data from the years 2016 and 2017 in order to
estimate effects that are not contaminated by the 2018 experiment. The results from 2016 and 2017
are very similar so we pool the two years (estimates separated by year are available in Section B in
the Appendix).
The pooled observational data for 2016 and 2017 represents the universe of Swedish delinquent
taxpayers with a December debt spanning from SEK 100 to 4,000. The only restriction made on
the sample is that we exclude individuals with registered income from any business activity, or
who we can in other ways define as self-employed. Self-employed are subject to different cut-offs
and not the primary study object of this paper. Other than information on the level of tax debt,
payments made to the tax agency and other income related information, the data hold information
on certain demographic characteristics, such as age, sex and marital status. In total, our sample
includes 258,000 units of tax payers and year. However, a large share of the sample have fairly low
outstanding debts. Focusing on the more relevant sample of individuals with a debt between SEK
1,000 and 3,000, the sample is reduced to the still substantial number of around 100,000 units of
taxpayers and year.
As mentioned above, the standard enforcement provides a distinct cut-off level at SEK 2,000.
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The effect of the threat of ending up with the EA is analyzed through a standard Regression
Discontinuity (RD) approach.
The identifying assumption is that the taxpayers do not systematically choose which side of
the 2,000-threshold to end up on. Since information on the 2,000-threshold is public (albeit not
very salient) it is possible that well informed taxpayers affect on which side they end up. One
way of doing this is to make strategic deductions or, to simply pay part of the debt to ensure that
it falls below the threshold. Whether these concerns invalidate the identification strategy is an
empirical question. We analyze this through the standard toolkit provided by the RD framework,
e.g. a MacCrary test of the frequency distribution and by analyzing the evolution of a number of
covariates over the threshold.
The empirical specification in our RD regressions will be:
Yi = α + f (Xi)+β1[Xi ≥ X̄ ]+ εi, (1)
where Yi is the outcome variable (different measures of payment) for taxpayer i, α is the constant
and f (Xi) captures the underlying relationship between the forcing variable, Xi (debt in December),
and the outcome variable. The parameter of interest (the potential jump at the threshold) is β
and εi is the error term. We will restrict f (Xi) to be piece-wise linear with a possible kink at
the threshold, i.e. f (Xi) = γ1Xi + γ21[Xi ≥ X̄ ]Xi. When checking for covariate balance around the
threshold we will use the analogous specifications, using the covariates as outcomes instead. The
covariates we analyze when checking for balance are: age, gender, income and marital status. For all
outcomes, we will report results for a wide range of bandwidths, including data-driven approaches
(Calonico et al., 2015).
A minor complicating factor is that all (overdue) debts to the STA are subject to a 16.5 percent
interest. The interest is added monthly to the taxpayer’s tax account. For a debt of SEK 2,000
the monthly interest amounts to SEK 27.50. This means that a taxpayer with a debt in December
between about SEK 1,973 and 2,000 will get a simple reminder without the EA threat in December,
but if she does not pay anything, the interest will carry her over the threshold in January. After the
January clearing she will therefore get an EA threat and thus be partially treated in any outcome
measure defined over a longer period. We therefore employ a so called donut RD approach, which
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simply means that we drop the taxpayers in an area around the threshold, which eliminates the
semi-treated taxpayers just below the threshold. The McCrary tests (see Appendix A) also show
that the we have a slight over representation of taxpayers above the SEK 2,000 cut-off. Note that
we were afraid of bunching just below SEK 2,000 since this is where a well informed taxpayer
could strategically end up by making partial payments to avoid the EA. Our analysis indicates
that this over representation is present also at SEK 1,000 and, to a minor extent, SEK 500, SEK
1,500 and SEK 3,000. We argue in Appendix A that this over representation is most likely due
to a psychological effect driven by taxpayers making partial payments. Taxpayers seem to aim for
simple numbers when making partial payments on their debts. The addition of monthly interest
then pushes the debts slightly above the simple number. The donut RD approach that we proposed
above also solves this problem. In all RD:s we therefore exclude the taxpayers in the region +/-
SEK 60 around each threshold.
3.2 RCT nudge study
In the year 2018, we conducted an RCT in collaboration with the STA, to be able to test our
remaining hypotheses. The RCT involved roughly 57,000 people who had a tax debt between SEK
1,000 and SEK 3,000 in December 2018. The taxpayers in any of the treatment groups received one
extra piece of paper with the standard December letter (either physically or electronically depending
on what means of communication the taxpayer had chosen).
Those whose debt fell below SEK 2,000, randomly received either of the letters 1 and 2 below,
where Letter 1 is the pure-nudge letter and Letter 2 expresses the ’minority norm’, which proved
to be the most effective nudge in the RCT run by Hallsworth et al. (2017). Those with a debt
of at least SEK 2,000 were randomly assigned any of the four letters below. For them, there was
a real threat of enforcement irrespective of any behavioral intervention. Some taxpayers may not
understand the full consequences of this, so we add an explaining treatment, where the consequences
of having the dept transferred to the EA are explained (letter 3). We also add a joint treatment
with both the minority norm and the explanation (letter 4).
Letter 1
Here comes a reminder that you have to pay your tax arrears. On the next page, you find
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information so you can easily make your tax payment.
Letter 2
More than nine out of ten people pay their tax on time. You belong to the minority who have
not paid us yet and therefore you get a reminder and information so you can easily make your tax
payment.
Letter 3
Here comes a reminder that you have to pay your tax arrears. On the next page, you find
information so you can easily make your tax payment. Pay on time so your tax debt is not transferred
to the Enforcement Agency.
If the debt is transferred to them, you have to pay SEK 600 in addition to your taxes due. You
also risk getting a payment default. Such default remains in the registers of credit bureaus for three
years and can make it difficult for you to, e.g., borrow money or to rent an apartment
Letter 4
More than nine out of ten people pay their taxes on time. You belong to the minority who have
not paid us yet and therefore you get a reminder and information so you can easily make your tax
payment. Pay on time so your tax debt is not transferred to the Enforcement Agency.
If the debt is transferred to them, you have to pay SEK 600 in addition to your taxes due. You
also risk getting a payment default. Such default remains in the registers of credit bureaus for three
years and can make it difficult for you to, e.g., borrow money or to rent an apartment
Letter 1 is a “neutral letter” that can be referred to as a pure nudge, i.e., it provides no infor-
mation in addition to what is communicated in the standard letter; we just add an extra piece of
paper (either a physical paper or an electronic "paper" for those that had signed up for an electronic
mailbox). However, all letter designs also involved a header saying "important notice" (see exact
designs of letters in Appendix E). Letter 2, the minority norm, is what Löfgren and Nordblom
(2020) refer to as a preference nudge, as it reminds the taxpayer of what most people do. Letter
3 is information to those not aware of the implications of having debt handed over to the EA. For
those who already know this, it is rather a preference nudge, just like Letter 2. Finally, letter 4 is
a combination of letter 2 and 3.
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Measuring the effect of the pure nudge, i.e., of Letter 1 could have been done by simply excluding
one random group from receiving any treatment at all. However, the policy rules of the STA do
not allow such different treatment of any group so we had to send some kind of extra letter to
everyone with debts within the treatment window, i.e., those with tax debts between SEK 1,000
and 3,000. Since the experiment created two artificial thresholds at SEK 1,000 and at SEK 3,000
these can be used to measure the effects of the neutral letter. Below and above these thresholds
the taxpayers received only the standard letters, i.e. a debt reminder below SEK 1,000 and the
standard EA threat letter above SEK 3,000. The analysis will be technically identical to the RD
analysis described above with one small caveat. Since we want to measure the effect of the neutral
letter compared to the default we will drop all other treatment groups from this analysis.8
The last analysis is based on the randomized experiment carried out in December 2018. The
experimental data is merged with observational characteristics from the STA, and we can thus check
for balance in the covariates by running regressions of the following form:
Ci = α +κ1Minorityi +κ2EAi +κ3MinEAi + εi (2)
where Ci is a covariate for taxpayer i and Minorityi, EAi and MinEAi represent three letter dummies
(the "neutral letter" will be excluded and thus captured by α). κ1−κ3 are the parameters of interest
capturing the effects of each letter type and εi is the error term. For the experiment below SEK
2,000, only the letter dummy Minorityi will be included.
The effects on outcomes (measures of debt payments) will be given by the analogous specification:
Yi = µ +β1Minorityi +β2EAi +β3MinEAi + γCi +ψi (3)
where the parameters of interest are β1−β3. The covariates (γCi) are excluded in some specifications.
8This exclusion of taxpayers invalidates the McCrary test. However, since the exclusion is purely random by
design we may include all taxpayers in the McCrary test even though they are excluded from the rest of the analysis.
15
4 Results
4.1 RD analysis of the threat of enforcement and of actual enforcement
We start by testing Hypothesis 1 by means of data from 2016 and 2017. Figures 3a and 3b show
the effect of the threat as well as of the realization of being transferred to the EA on the probability
of paying taxes. In both cases the horizontal axis’ show the debt to the STA in December (2016
or 2017), with a cut-off at SEK 2,000. Along the vertical axis, Figure 3a measures the share of
individuals who paid their debt to STA in December, while Figure 3b shows the share who paid to
either the STA or EA at any point from December through February. The figures are constructed
by implementing data-driven regression discontinuity plots with a linear polynomial (Calonico et al.,
2015).
Figure 3: Effects of enforcement: Payment in December and December through February, depending
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(b) Payment in December, January or February to
STA or EA
Notes: RD plots with a linear polynomial. The plot is based on pooled data of all taxpayers with debt at
the STA in December 2016 or 2017 between SEK 100 and SEK 4,000. Running variable along the x-axis
represent debt in SEK at the STA in December. Individuals with debt ’x’ in the interval (1,940 ≤ x ≤
2,060) are dropped (see text for more information). Figure 3a analyze if taxpayers payed anything to STA
within the month of December, while 3b analyze if they payed anything to STA or the EA anytime from
December through February. Number of bins are selected using the default data-driven approach in the R
command rdrobust, which uses spacing’s estimators.
The figures convey a clear message: in line with Hypothesis 1, the threat of ending up with the
16
EA is a powerful enforcement mechanism. Already in December, around nine percentage points
more individuals pay the tax debt after receiving the threat of ending up with the EA. For the
total payment, including January and February payments, the size of the effect is roughly doubled
to around 20 percentage points. That the total effect of December through February payments is
bigger than only December payments is expected. In January, non-payers with December debts
larger than SEK 2,000 are actually transferred to the EA. In other words, in Figure 3b taxpayers
are not only reacting to the threat, but also to the actual realization of the threat.
We provide more precise parametric estimations the Appendix (Section B; Table B1). The esti-
mates confirm the graphical evidence; for bandwidths between SEK 400–600 the estimate is almost
exactly 9 percentage points and highly significant for the short-run payments. For the smallest
reported bandwidth, SEK 200, the estimate drops to around 6 percent and is only marginally sig-
nificant. The longer-run effects are even more stable and statistically significant. For all reported
bandwidths we find highly significant effects of around 20 percentage points.
To validate the underlying assumptions of the RD-design, section B in the Appendix also includes
graphical, as well as parametric balance tests for possible covariates (Figures B1a to B1d and Table
B2). The included controls, such as age, sex, marital status and labor income, all balance well
and give us no indication of systematic sorting around the threshold.9 Last, as a robustness check
we have also performed the analyses in Figure 3 separately for 2016 and 2017. These results are
displayed in Figures B2a to B2d, and provide the same pattern as observed in Figures 3a and 3b.
4.2 Effect of pure nudge: 1,000 and 3,000 cut-offs
We continue by testing Hypothesis 2, i.e., the effect of a pure nudge in the form of a neutral letter
(letter 1). We use the 2018 data, and analyze the SEK 1,000 and SEK 3,000 cut-offs, between which
everyone received an extra sheet in the letter from STA (below 1,000 and above 3,000 no-one received
an extra sheet). Figures 4a and 4b show that this neutral letter indeed caused a larger payment
probability at the SEK 1,000 cut-off. The effect of payment in December is around seven percentage
points. Unlike in Figure 3, the effect over December to February is not larger than the effect of
only December payments. It can also be noted that the effects are remarkably stable. In Section C
9Section A in the Appendix in turn provides an extensive discussion about potential bunching, and argues against
any problem related to sorting using a number of frequency plots.
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in the Appendix, we show parametric results for different bandwidths and including several control
variables, with only minor changes to the estimated coefficient. The formal regressions in Table C1
confirm that the effect is around seven percentage points.
In contrast to the large effects at the SEK 1,000 cut-off, Figures 4c and 4d do not suggest that
the neutral letter had any effect for the taxpayers at the SEK 3,000 cut-off. We see no indication of
a (downward) jump at the SEK 3,000 threshold either for the short or longer-run outcomes. Section
C also includes parametric results for the SEK 3,000 cut-off (C4). As expected from the graphical
evidence, the estimated effects are unstable and mostly insignificant.10
We hypothesized in Hypotheses 2 and 3 that taxpayers would react to a pure nudge and that the
reaction would be stronger for those with a debt smaller than SEK 2,000, i.e., where the decision
whether or not to pay is less important than for those who risk enforcement. Indeed, we find that
those with small debts react strongly, while those who risk ending up with the EA do not alter their
payments significantly due to the pure nudge.
4.3 Effect of minority norm and EA information letter
We now turn to the actual experiment and estimate the responses to the different formulations in
the letters. Table 1 shows the results below the 2,000 cut-off, where we test Hypothesis 4 (that
taxpayers react to information that most others pay tax on time) by comparing behavior between
the two different treatments, the control letter (letter 1) and the minority-norm letter (letter 2).
We hence regress “paid in December to STA” (column 1 and 2) or “paid December—February to
STA/EA”(column 3 and 4) on a binary variable coded as receiving letter 2 or not.
Three things are noticeable: First, when comparing columns 1 and 3 (no additional covariates)
with columns 2 and 4(full list of extra covariates included in regression) the point estimate remains
unchanged. This brings credibility to the experiment: there seem to be no observable confounding
characteristics that affect both the payment tendency and the probability to receive letter 2. This
conclusion is further corroborated by balance tests, which are provided in the Appendix (see Table
D1). The results from the balance tests indicate that the treatment groups seem to be well balanced
over the available covariates. Second, we observe a positive effect from the preference nudge, but it
10Section C also include both parametric and non-parametric covariate balance tests for the 1,000 SEK cut-off and
the 3,000 cut-off (Figures C1a to C1d and Figures C2a to C2d and Tables C5 and C6). These suggest that covariates
indeed balance over the cut-off.
18
Figure 4: Effects of the pure nudge: Payment in December or December through February, depend-
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2500 3000 3500 4000















































































































































































































































































































































































2500 3000 3500 4000




















(d) Payment in December, January or February to
STA or EA
Notes: RD plots with a linear polynomial. The running variable along the x-axis represents debt to the
STA. The plots in Figure (a)–(b) focus on the SEK 1,000 threshold and is based on data on all taxpayers
with debt at the STA in December 2018 between SEK 100 and SEK 1,900. Individuals with debt ’x’ in
the interval (940 ≥ x ≤ 1,060) are dropped. Figure (c)–(d) focus on the SEK 3,000 threshold and is based
on data on all taxpayers with debt at the STA in December 2018 between SEK 2,100 and SEK 4,000.
Individuals with debt ’x’ in the interval (2,940 ≤ x ≤ 3,060) are dropped. For bin procedure see 3.
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is small. In addition to the baseline probability of paying to the STA in December, the minority-
norm letter brings an additional 1.8 percentage point probability of paying. While this effect is
statistically significant, it is economically of much lower significance than the effect of the threat
of EA, as well as of simply getting the neutral letter 1 (compare Figures 4a and 3a). Third, the
direct effect of paying in December is stronger than the “long term” effect of paying until the end
of February.
Table 1: Results for minority-norm letter below SEK 2,000 cut-off
Dependent variable; Payed in:
Dec Dec Dec–Feb Dec–Feb
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Letter 2 (minority norm) 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.012** 0.012***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Observations 35,721 35,721 35,721 35,721
Covariates NO YES NO YES
Note: Linear regressions applying Equation 3, only focusing on β1 (hence: Yi = µ +β1Minorityi + γCi +ψi). Column (1) and
(2) use December payments to the STA as dependent variable. Column (3) to (4) consider payment to the STA and/or EA
December through February. Robust standard errors in parenthesis, with ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Sample is restricted
to those with a debt between SEK 1,000 and 1,999. Covariates include age (linear), standardized labor income and dummies
for sex, being married, and paper or electronic reminder.
Turning to the sample who had debt exceeding SEK 2,000, we now have several letters to
consider, allowing us to test both Hypothesis 4 and 5 in this segment of the sample. In addition to
the minority-norm Letter 2, we also consider Letter 3, containing comprehensive information about
the EA, and Letter 4, containing a combination of the two. Column (1) in Table 2 gives the effects
on December payments without any covariates, after which we use the full set of controls in column
(2). The next two columns show the total effects on payment in December through February and
the last column gives the treatment effect on the binary outcome indicating a debt to the EA in
January of 2019 (full specification with covariates).
The short-run effect is positive and statistically significant (first two outcomes). We find roughly
the same effect, about 2.5 to 3 percentage points higher payment rate, from letter 2 (minority norm)
and letter 3 (EA info) as compared to letter 1. The combined letter (letter 4: both minority norm
and EA info) has a slightly higher treatment effect of around 4.5 percentage points. However, no
treatment effects are statistically different from each-other in a pairwise comparison. Turning to the
20
Table 2: Effect of different letter formulations, above SEK 2,000 cut-off
Dependent variable:
Payed December Payed December–February With EA, Jan
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Letter 2 (minority norm) 0.029*** 0.030*** 0.012* 0.014** -0.030***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009)
Letter 3 (EA info) 0.024*** 0.025*** 0.011 0.011* -0.023***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009)
Letter 4 (2 and 3 ) 0.042*** 0.045*** 0.015** 0.018** -0.044***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010)
Observations 21,449 21,449 21,449 21,449 21,449
Covariates NO YES NO YES YES
Note: Linear regressions applying Equation 3. Column (1) and (2) focus only on December payments to the STA. Column
(3) to (4) consider payment to the STA and/or EA December through February. Column (5) includes an outcome =1 if
an individual had a debt with the EA in January, and =0 otherwise. Robust standard errors in parenthesis, with ∗p<0.1;
∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Sample is restricted to those with debt between SEK 2,000 and 2,999. Covariates include age (linear),
standardized labor income and dummies for sex, married, and paper or electronic reminder.
longer-run effects we find lower treatment effects for all letters (see columns 3 and 4). The combined
letter, letter 4, still has a higher effect compared to the other two, but the estimates now hovers
between 1 and 2 percentage points. It makes intuitive sense that the longer-run effects are lower
since individuals that refrained from paying have been handed over and received sharp letters from
the EA in January. The longer-run treatment effects may thus be attenuated since the reactions to
the standard EA letters in January may partially iron out the differences between treatment groups.
Since the individuals above the SEK 2,000 threshold suffer a real threat of having their debt
transferred to the EA, the most policy relevant outcome for this group is arguably if they actually
did get transferred (see third outcome above: "Debt to EA in January"). If the STA follows
procedures, this measure should be very closely correlated to the December payment outcome, but
with reversed signs. It is thus reassuring that the treatment effects in column (5) for the EA debt
almost perfectly mirrors the December payment outcome in column (2).
The abovementioned results support Hypoteses 4 and 5, i.e., that both a preference nudge and
simplified information increase tax payments. However, contrary to the pure nudge, the effects from
the preference nudge (in addition to those of the pure nudge) are of similar magnitude whether tax
21
debt in December 2018 was below or above SEK 2,000, i.e., whether the taxpayer risked enforcement
or not.
4.4 Heterogeneity: is electronic communication as effective as paper commu-
nication?
As anticipated in Hypothesis 2 and found in the estimations using the SEK 1,000 threshold, just
adding an extra piece of paper, with neutral information, increases payment substantially. Yet,
as many public authorities around the world now try to switch to electronic communication, a
key policy-aspect is if nudges cause increased compliance, only with the addition of an actual
physical letter or if the effect prevails also with electronic communication. Hypothesis 6 predicts
that electronic communication is less effective in terms of nudges. Thanks to the great quality of the
STA data we know whether the taxpayer has chosen an electronic mailbox or to receive traditional
physical letters. We thus have a unique opportunity to study the effects of nudges, both in physical
and in electronic letter versions.
In Figure 5, we replicate the results for the SEK 1,000 cut-off, but separately for those choosing
paper communication, and those choosing electronic communication. We analyze both December
payments and total payments December through February. As seen in the graphs, the reaction
seems much stronger for the paper letters compared to the e-letters. In Table C2 in the Appendix
we confirm that this visual pattern also holds in a formal RD analysis. The causal effect of the pure
nudge is around 10 percentage points (both short and longer run) for the group receiving a physical
letter, while the effect is around 5 percentage points and only marginally significant (short run) and
insignificant (longer run) for the electronic letter group.
While the result is completely in line with Hypothesis 6, we cannot make a strict causal claim
in this comparison since the taxpayers have self-selected into e-letters. We have, however, imple-
mented linear interaction models of the effect of the SEK 1,000 cut-off, with additional covariates
(gender, age, marital status and income) interacted with the treatment effects and the debt level. In
these specifications, the interacted treatment effect for letter type is statistically unaffected by the
inclusion of additional interacted treatments. This indicates that the lower reaction to electronic
letters may actually be a causal effect and not only due to selection. And it is intuitively plausible
22




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































(c) Payment in December, January or February to




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































(d) Payment in December, January or February to
STA or EA, electronic
Notes: Payment in December or December through February, depending on debt in December to Swedish
tax authority (STA) 2018. Stratifying effects for paper and electronic letters. See Figures 4a and 4b for
more information.
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that electronic versions of pure nudges are less effective than physical ones. It is arguably much
more salient to receive an extra sheet in a physical letter than in an electronic one.11.
Turning to the actual letter experiment for the sample below SEK 2,000, the pattern is reversed,
though. For this group, we compare the effect of letter 2 on top of letter 1. As seen in the two first
columns of Table C2 the additional effect of letter 2 is only significant for the electronic letters; this
holds true for both short- and longer-run outcomes. The content of the letter thus seems to matter
for the electronic letters, while the mere presence of an extra sheet of paper is what matters for
physical letters.
The pattern becomes less clear when turning to the experiment for those with a debt above SEK
2,000. For most letter versions, the reaction is stronger for the electronic letters but the differences
are generally small and statistically insignificant.
11See interaction results in Table C3 in Appendix
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Table 3: Heterogeneity results; paper vs. electronic declarations
Below SEK 2,000 cut-off Above SEK 2,000 cut-off
Paper Electronic Paper Electronic
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PANEL A (Dec payment)
Letter 2 0.002 0.041*** 0.025** 0.035**
(0.006) (0.008) (0.011) (0.015)
Letter 3 0.021* 0.029**
(0.011) (0.015)
Letter 4 0.035*** 0.058***
(0.012) (0.016)
Observations 21,261 14,460 13,194 8,255
PANEL B (Dec–Feb payment)
Letter 2 -0.002 0.032*** 0.005 0.026***
(0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010)
Letter 3 0.006 0.018*
(0.009) (0.010)
Letter 4 0.019* 0.015
(0.010) (0.011)
Observations 21,261 14,460 13,194 8,255
Note: Linear regressions using the same method as in Tables 1 and 2. Sample is restricted to those with debt between SEK
1,000 and 1,999 and i) paper declaration in column (1) and ii) electronic declaration in column (2). Sample restricted to
those with debts between 2,000 and 2,999 and iii) paper declaration in column (3) and iv) electronic declaration in column
(4). On average, around 60 percent uses paper declaration. Robust standard errors in parenthesis, with ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05;
∗∗∗p<0.01.
5 Conclusions
We have studied how delinquent taxpayers can be motivated to pay their taxes due, and we have
specifically compared the effects from enforcement with those from nudges and information. Coun-
tries differ in their enforcement strategies concerning tax delinquencies (OECD, 2014). We have
argued that the Swedish strategy is particularly well suited to quantify the effects from standard
enforcement and nudges. The Swedish standard enforcement provides a natural experiment that
may be used for identification. At a tax debt at SEK 2,000 (approx. EUR 200), there is a sharp
cut-off in treatment. Taxpayers with an unpaid debt at or above the cut-off in early December get
notified that upon non-payment the debt will be transferred to the special Enforcement Agency
25
(EA) that carries out the actual enforcement, a transfer that is carried out in January. Smaller
debts remain with the tax collecting agency (the Swedish Tax Agency – STA), that has no particular
means of enforcement. Hence, around this cut-off in the Swedish legislation we analyzed the effects
of enforcement and of the threat of it using an RD analysis. To be able to compare the standard
enforcement to milder nudges we also conducted an RCT, using letters with different formulations.
Our analyses provide several take-aways:
First, the standard threat of enforcement, i.e. sending a letter from STA stating that the debt
will be handed over to the EA upon non-payment, is effective for increasing payments. Informing
Swedish taxpayers that their debt will be transferred to the EA upon non-payment increases the
likelihood for payment within a month by almost ten percentage points compared to just sending a
simple reminder. Our longer-run outcome – payment within three month – shows a corresponding
effect of around 20 percentage points. This estimate also includes the reaction to actually having
the debt transferred to the EA.
Second, also using an RD analysis, we found that a pure nudge12, i.e., just adding an extra piece
of paper with neutral wording (except the heading stating ’Important information’), was effective
for the delinquent taxpayers who were not at risk of enforcement upon non-payment. The effect for
those with debt below SEK 2,000 was of similar magnitude as from the threat of enforcement for
those just above. Those who risked enforcement were more likely to pay to start with, and the pure
nudge did not increase their propensity to pay any further. This result is in line with Löfgren and
Nordblom (2020), who argue that nudges are more effective for inattentive, relatively less important
choices. The result also provides a reassuring result for tax agencies. Based on our findings, a mild
pure nudge, simply making the payment due more salient, may give effects on tax compliance of
the same magnitude as threats of enforcement, which is arguably much more costly.
Third, using a nudge alluding to social norms to increase payments further, we estimated effects
of roughly 2 percentage points in addition to the pure nudge, regardless of whether the stakes were
high (above SEK 2,000) or low (below SEK 2,000). This means that the additional effect, on top of
the pure nudge, of a preference nudge is relatively small but prevails also in cases when the stakes
are high. However, the total effect of the preference nudge (as compared to no nudge at all) was
substantially higher when the stakes were low compared to the high-stake case. In line with the
12Just catching attention, without giving any extra information
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results by e.g., Hallsworth et al. (2017) and Imbert et al. (2020), informing about the consequences
of being transferred to the EA, were about 2.5 percentage points more likely to pay than those
who received the pure nudge. Hence, the effect is significant, but not very large. Most Swedish tax
delinquents thus seem to be aware of the consequences of the enforcement.
Fourth, the pure nudge only had a significant effect on tax delinquents who received a physical
letter. We found no significant effect for those who received an electronic notice. However, the
additional effect of the social-norm nudge was stronger for those who received electronic letters.
Around the world, public authorities are turning towards more electronic communication with
citizens. While we cannot interpret these results completely causally (since taxpayers self-select
into the way they want to communicate with authorities), at face value, these results indicate that
the trend towards more electronic communication may make it harder to use simple pure nudges,
while there is still room for nudges with actual content, such as preference nudges.
The policy relevance of our study comes from the fact that standard enforcement usually is very
costly to both individuals and society as a hole. In Sweden, there is a mandatory fee of SEK 600 for
every new case that ends up at the EA. However, the impact of this fee is probably dwarfed by the
indirect consequences of getting transferred to the EA. If the debt is not payed immediately, the
debtor will get a payment default that will make it hard to borrow money and rent an apartment.
Furthermore, there is a non-trivial stigma attached to having a debt to the EA in Sweden. It would
thus be desirable if the hard threat of EA could be replaced with mild and relatively cheap nudges;
or at least if the enforcement toolkit would be augmented with effective nudges at an early stage
that reduces the number of debtors at risk of ending up with the EA. For many tax agencies around
the world, effective mild substitutes to "brute force" enforcement are therefore very attractive. The
results from this large-scale study show that standard enforcement, and the threat of it, indeed
matter for tax compliance. However, we also found that mild nudges may also be effective in
increasing tax payments among delinquent taxpayers. We found that for a taxpayer whose tax debt
was about SEK 2,000 the effect on the payment probability was of the same magnitude from the
threat of enforcement and from a milder nudge.
Indeed, almost the same increase in tax payments may be reached by cheaper (both to the
individual and to society) nudges as by the threat of standard enforcement. Although the study
27
was carried out in the Swedish context, it is likely that nudges are generally effective in increasing
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In Figure A1 below, we show a frequency plot for the December debts for all three years pooled (2016-
2018). The frequency looks smooth in general but there seems to be a small over-representation of
individuals around both SEK 1,000 and around SEK 2,000. When zooming in around SEK 1,000
and SEK 2,000 (see Figure A2) the pattern is clearer.
There is a puzzling over-representation of individuals slightly above both thresholds. A strategic
taxpayer that wants to avoid the EA would rather bunch below the 2000 cutoff. And no specific
rules relate to the 1000 cutoff.
We have access to payments to the STA made earlier throughout the year. When we plot the
share of individuals, conditional on their December debt, that made an earlier partial payment to
STA, a similar pattern emerges. The individuals with debts close to (slightly above) SEK 1,000
and SEK 2,000 have made prior payments more frequently. The reason for the pattern we see
is thus likely that the taxpayers aim for simple numbers when making partial early payments on
their debts. We can also confirm this by looking at the December debt distribution but drop the
taxpayers that have made earlier payments. If our story is correct, the “spikes" in the frequency
distribution should then vanish. As can be seen from the graph below (see Figure A3), the spikes
clearly disappears when we only include taxpayers that have not made prior partial payments.
One solution to the problem is thus to only include tax payers that have not made prior payments
before December. However, this reduces the sample size substantially. Our preferred solution to
the problem will instead rely on the proposed donut strategy, which is necessary to employ at the
SEK 2,000 threshold anyway due to the monthly interest that applies to the debts. When we drop
the taxpayers in a +/- SEK 60 region around the threshold the McCrary test is passed at all three
relevant thresholds, SEK 1,000 (year 2018), SEK, 2,000 (year 2016 and 2017) and SEK 3,000 (year
2018).
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Notes: Frequency of observations at each unit of saldo (Swedish SEK) over all years (2016-2018). Each
point represent the observations per SEK.
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(b) Around 2000 SEK debt
Notes: Frequency of observations at each unit of saldo (Swedish SEK) over all years (2016-2018). Each
point represent the observations per SEK. Sample restricted to 900–1100 in Figure (a) and 1,900–2,100 in
Figure (b).





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Notes: Frequency of observations at each unit of saldo (Swedish SEK) over all years (2016-2018). Each
point represent the observations per SEK. Figure (a) keep only individuals who payed some amount to the
STA between Jan 1 and Dec 1, the year of analysis. So, for those in the 2016 sample, these individuals
payed some amount to the STA between Jan 1 and Dec 1, 2016. Figure (b) shows the other group; those
who did not pay anything in advance.
A-3
B Enforcement Agency: SEK 2,000 cut-off material
Table B1: Parametric results, SEK 2,000 cut-off, Payment December and Payment December–
February
Bandwidths:
Optimal H=600 H=400 H=200
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Payed Dec 0.093*** 0.093*** 0.088*** 0.057*
(0.012) (0.011) (0.016) (0.033)
Bandwidth 560 600 400 200
Observations 48309 52129 32371 13362
Payed Dec-Feb 0.19*** 0.19*** 0.19*** 0.17***
(0.013) (0.0098) (0.014) (0.029)
Bandwidth 440 600 400 200
Observations 36,311 52,129 32,371 13,362
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Standard errors calculated using nearest neighbor approach. Optimal bandwidth in
column (1) is calculated using the mean squared error approach (one common bandwidth). Estimates done using rdrobust
package: with local linear polynomial and triangular kernel. All estimates include age, dummy for sex and married and
standardized labor income as controls. We use a donut type estimation, where we drop all individuals with December
debt larger than SEK 1,940 but smaller than SEK 2,060.
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(d) Std. Labor Income
Notes: Pooled data of all taxpayers with < SEK 4,000 in debt at the STA in December 2016 or 2017.
We further use a donut type structure, where we drop all individuals with December debt larger than
SEK 1,940 but smaller than SEK 2,060. Running variable along the x-axis represent debt at the STA in
December. Figure B1a analyze age, Figure B1b the share of women, Figure B1c the share of married and
Figure B1d standardized labor income.
A-5
Table B2: Covariate balance, SEK 2,000 cut-off, parametric results
Bandwidths:
VARIABLE: Optimal H=600 H=400 H=200
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age 0.23 0.21 -0.11 0.38
(0.32) (0.37) (0.51) (1.1)
Bandwidth 721 600 400 200
Observations 64,375 52,162 32,392 13,372
Married -0.0045 -0.0029 -0.003 0.023
(0.012) (0.011) (0.016) (0.033)
Bandwidth 546 600 400 200
Observations 46,905 52,162 32,392 13,372
Women -0.0089 -0.0067 -1.8e-05 0.0073
(0.01) (0.012) (0.016) (0.034)
Bandwidth 735 600 400 200
Observations 65,726 52,162 32,392 13,372
Std. Labor Income 0.0055 0.0022 0.0026 -0.024
(0.022) (0.02) (0.028) (0.059)
Bandwidth 543 600 400 200
Observations 46,471 52,129 32,371 13,362
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗ ∗ ∗p<0.01. Standard errors calculated using nearest neighbor approach. Optimal bandwidth
in column (1) is calculated using the mean squared error approach (one common bandwidth). Estimates done using
rdrobust package: with local linear polynomial and triangular kernel. We use a donut type estimation, where we drop all
individuals with December debt larger than SEK 1,940 but smaller than SEK 2,060.
A-6
Figure B2: Payment in December or December through February, depending on debt in December
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(b) payment in December, January or February to
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(d) payment in December, January or February to
STA or EA, 2017
Notes: Replicating main result in Figure 3; but with separate data analysis by year. (a)-(b) show 2016,
(c)-(d) show 2017.
A-7
C SEK 1,000 and SEK 3,000 cut-off, 2018–2019.
Table C1: Parametric results, SEK 1,000 cut-off
Bandwidths:
Optimal H=600 H=400 H=200
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Payed Dec 0.071** 0.072*** 0.081*** 0.046
(0.029) (0.014) (0.02) (0.042)
Bandwidth 271 600 400 200
Observations 15,365 44,255 25,756 10,066
Payed Dec-Feb 0.046 0.063*** 0.07*** 0.028
(0.031) (0.013) (0.019) (0.039)
Bandwidth 242 600 400 200
Observations 13,134 44,255 25,756 10,066
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Standard errors calculated using nearest neighbor approach. Optimal bandwidth in
column (1) is calculated using the mean squared error approach (one common bandwidth). Estimates done using rdrobust
package: with local linear polynomial and triangular kernel. All estimates include age, dummy for sex and married and
standardized labor income as controls. We use a donut type estimation, where we drop all individuals with December
debt larger than SEK 940 but smaller than SEK 1,060.
A-8





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Notes: Data of all taxpayers with ≤ SEK 1,900 debt at the STA in December 2018. We further use a
donut type structure, where we drop all individuals with December debt larger than SEK 940 but smaller
than SEK 1,060. Running variable along the x-axis represent debt at the STA in December.
A-9
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Notes: Data of all taxpayers with ≥ SEK 2,100 debt at the STA in December 2018. Running variable
along the x-axis represent debt at the STA in December. We use a donut type estimation, where we drop
all individuals with December debt larger than SEK 2940 but smaller than SEK 3,060.
A-10
Table C2: Parametric results, SEK 1,000 cut-off; separated for taxpayers getting a physical paper
or an electronic reminder
Bandwidths:
Optimal H=600 H=400 H=200
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PANEL A: PAPER
Payed Dec 0.096*** 0.098*** 0.11*** 0.081
(0.037) (0.018) (0.025) (0.054)
Bandwidth 276 600 400 200
Observations 9,186 25,740 14,955 5,824
Payed Dec-Feb 0.11** 0.093*** 0.11*** 0.11**
(0.054) (0.017) (0.023) (0.048)
Bandwidth 184 600 400 200
Observations 5,150 25,740 14,955 5,824
PANEL B: ELECTRONIC
Payed Dec 0.049 0.044** 0.053* 0.0019
(0.044) (0.022) (0.031) (0.066)
Bandwidth 279 600 400 200
Observations 6,762 18,514 10,800 4,241
Payed Dec-Feb -0.088 0.028 0.022 -0.076
(0.07) (0.021) (0.03) (0.064)
Bandwidth 190 600 400 200
Observations 3,964 18,514 10,800 4,241
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Standard errors calculated using nearest neighbor approach. Optimal bandwidth in
column (1) is calculated using the mean squared error approach (one common bandwidth). Estimates done using rdrobust
package: with local linear polynomial and triangular kernel. All estimates include age, dummy for sex and married and
standardized labor income as controls. We use a donut type estimation, where we drop all individuals with December debt
larger than SEK 940 but smaller than SEK 1,060.
A-11





Interaction (Letter 1*paper) 0.057∗∗ 0.064∗ 0.014
(0.026) (0.034) (0.070)
Observations 44,324 25,822 10,110
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Coefficient from a linear regression, using an interaction model. We fit the following
linear model: Yi = α + β1Letter1i + β2Paperi + β3Paperi ∗ Letter1i + Γ1Xi + Γ2Xi ∗ Letter1i + γ3Debti + Γ4Xi ∗Debti + Γ5Xi ∗ Letter1i ∗
Debti + γ6Debti ∗Paperi + ui, where Yi is payed in December or not. On the right hand side Letter1i represent receiving the
pure nudge letter 1; which in practice in this sample means having a debt≥ 1,000. Paperi is =1, if the tax payer receives
letters on paper by standard post, and is =0, if the tax payer receives communication digitally. The coefficient in the
Table is β3, measuring the interaction effect. Xi is a vector of covariates, including age, married or not, labor income and
sex., Debti measures the debt to the Tax Agency in December. In column (1) we restrict the sample to a bandwidth of
600 around the SEK 1,000 cut-off, in column (2) 400 and in column (3) 200. A symmetric donut of SEK 60 is applied,
similarly to all other analyses.
Table C4: Parametric results, SEK 3,000 cut-off
Bandwidths:
Optimal H=600 H=400 H=200
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Payed Dec 0.22 0.022 0.079* 0.22**
(0.16) (0.033) (0.046) (0.1)
Bandwidth 151 600 400 200
Observations 1,753 9,772 6,288 2,587
Payed Dec-Feb 0.17 0.017 0.064* 0.15*
(0.12) (0.025) (0.036) (0.078)
Bandwidth 154 600 400 200
Observations 1,813 9,772 6,288 2,587
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Standard errors calculated using nearest neighbor approach. Optimal bandwidth in
column (1) is calculated using the mean squared error approach (one common bandwidth). Estimates done using rdrobust
package: with local linear polynomial and triangular kernel. All estimates include age, dummy for sex and married and
standardized labor income as controls. We use a donut type estimation, where we drop all individuals with December
debt larger than SEK 2940 but smaller than SEK 3,060.
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Table C5: Covariate balance, SEK 1,000 cut-off, parametric results
Bandwidths:
VARIABLE: Optimal H=600 H=400 H=200
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age -0.3 -0.12 -0.31 0.93
(0.59) (0.49) (0.68) (1.5)
Bandwidth 472 600 400 200
Observations 32,003 44,255 25,756 10,066
Married -0.052** -0.0048 -0.024 -0.078*
(0.025) (0.014) (0.02) (0.042)
Bandwidth 308 600 400 200
Observations 18,306 44,255 25,756 10,066
Women -0.021 -0.012 -0.021 -0.078*
(0.021) (0.015) (0.021) (0.044)
Bandwidth 399 600 400 200
Observations 25,756 44,255 25,756 10,066
Std. Labor Income 0.072* 0.035 0.07* 0.044
(0.043) (0.027) (0.036) (0.075)
Bandwidth 333 600 400 200
Observations 20,271 44,255 25,756 10,066
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗ ∗ ∗p<0.01. Standard errors calculated using nearest neighbor approach. Optimal bandwidth
in column (1) is calculated using the mean squared error approach (one common bandwidth). Estimates done using
rdrobust package: with local linear polynomial and triangular kernel. We use a donut type estimation, where we drop all
individuals with December debt larger than SEK 940 but smaller than SEK 1,060.
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Table C6: Covariate balance, SEK 3,000 cut-off, parametric results
Bandwidths:
VARIABLE: Optimal H=600 H=400 H=200
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age 3.4 1 2.1 4
(2.2) (1.1) (1.5) (3.3)
Bandwidth 286 600 400 200
Observations 4,213 9,772 6,288 2,587
Married 0.065 0.035 0.045 0.15*
(0.065) (0.032) (0.044) (0.09)
Bandwidth 270 600 400 200
Observations 3,895 9,772 6,288 2,587
Women 0.0092 0.016 0.0087 -0.071
(0.051) (0.033) (0.046) (0.1)
Bandwidth 362 600 400 200
Observations 5,577 9,772 6,288 2,587
Std. Labor Income 0.27** 0.064 0.056 0.27**
(0.12) (0.051) (0.067) (0.14)
Bandwidth 228 600 400 200
Observations 3,163 9,772 6,288 2,587
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗ ∗ ∗p<0.01. Standard errors calculated using nearest neighbor approach. Optimal bandwidth
in column (1) is calculated using the mean squared error approach (one common bandwidth). Estimates done using
rdrobust package: with local linear polynomial and triangular kernel. We use a donut type estimation, where we drop all
individuals with December debt larger than SEK 2,940 but smaller than SEK 3,060.
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D Letter experiment
Table D1: Covariate Balance for letter regressions
Dependent variable:
Letter 2 Letter 2 Letter 3 Letter 4
<2000 >2000 >2000 >2000
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age 0.00002 -0.0001 0.0004* -0.0003
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Women -0.005 0.008 -0.008 -0.003
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Married -0.003 0.003 -0.004 -0.005
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
Paper 0.009 -0.001 -0.002 0.011*
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
Std. Labor Income -0.0001 -0.002 0.004 -0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Observations 35,721 21,449 21,449 21,449
F Statistic 0.858 0.511 1.543 1.476
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗ ∗ ∗p<0.01. Covariate balance tests for 2018 data (experiment data). Coefficients represent
effects from linear regressions with different letter types as left hand side variable.
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Payment request  
Your debt to the STA is 
Interest payment until 2015-12-28 
Payment due 




Deficit on the tax account 
Amounts below SEK 100 do not need to be paid now. The 
amount remains in the tax account and interest is calculated. 
Note that from now on high interest applies, at least 16.25%, 
on all deficits in the tax account. When the debt amounts to 
at least SEK 100, you will receive a payment request. You 
must then pay the amount so that it is registered on the 
Swedish Tax Agency's bank giro 5050-1055 no later than the 
date stated in the payment request.
If you do not pay, the debt can be handed over to the 
Enforcement Agency for collection. For deficits that are 
handed over to the Enforcement Agency low interest, at least 
1.25%, applies.  




NOTE! Your debt will be transferred to the Enforcement Agency if you do not pay on 
time. See the demand for payment.  
 
Information 
Deficit on the tax account 
Amounts below SEK 100 do not need to be paid now. The 
amount remains in the tax account and interest is calculated. 
Note that from now on high interest applies, at least 16.25%, 
on all deficits in the tax account. When the debt amounts to 
at least SEK 100, you will receive a payment request. You 
must then pay the amount so that it is registered on the 
Swedish Tax Agency's bank giro 5050-1055 no later than the 
date stated in the payment request.
If you do not pay, the debt can be handed over to the 
Enforcement Agency for collection. For deficits that are 
handed over to the Enforcement Agency low interest, at least 
1.25%, applies.  
 
NOTE! 
Your debt may be handed over to the Enforcement Agency if 
you do not pay in time, both the requested amount and all 
other taxes and fees that are due this month. 






NOTE! Your debt will be handed over to the 
Enforcement Agency if: 
- you still have a deficit in the tax account on the 
26th of this month (or the next weekday if the 26th 
falls on a public holiday) - regardless of what the 
deficit refers to. 
Fee and payment default 
When a debt is handed over to the Enforcement 
Agency, a fee of SEK 600 will be added. In addition, 
it may result in a payment default in the credit 
reporting companies' records. This default can, for 
example, lead to you having difficulty borrowing 
money, getting a job, getting an apartment or a 
telephone subscription. 
E.3 Nudge letters sent through experiment
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Name and address 
goes here 
Important information 
Letter 1, 2, 3 and 4 
Letter specific text goes here:  
Letter 1: “Here comes a reminder that you have to pay your tax arrears. On the next page, you find information so you 
can easily make your tax payment.” 
Letter 2: “More than nine out of ten people pay their tax on time. You belong to the minority who have not paid us yet 
and therefore you get a reminder and information so you can easily make your tax payment.” 
Letter 3: “Here comes a reminder that you have to pay your tax arrears. On the next page, you find information so you 
can easily make your tax payment. Pay on time so your tax debt is not transferred to the Enforcement Agency. 
If the debt is transferred to them, you have to pay SEK 600 in addition to your taxes due. You also risk getting a 
payment default. Such default remains in the registers of credit bureaus for three years and can make it difficult for 
you to, e.g., borrow money or to rent an apartment.” 
Letter 4 (displayed): “More than nine out of ten people pay their taxes on time. You belong to the minority who have 
not paid us yet and therefore you get a reminder and information so you can easily make your tax payment. Pay on 
time so your tax debt is not transferred to the Enforcement Agency. 
If the debt is transferred to them, you have to pay SEK 600 in addition to your taxes due. You also risk getting a 
payment default. Such default remains in the registers of credit bureaus for three years and can make it difficult for 
you to, e.g., borrow money or to rent an apartment.” 
